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Security strategies in humanitarian action
- Page updated on18 de April de 2025
Providing humanitarian assistance to people affected by conflicts and humanitarian crises is dangerous. Every year more than 150 humanitarian workers die victims of violent attacks by armed groups. Another 130 are victims of kidnappings. The problem, far from being solved, worsens year after year, increasingly restricting the humanitarian space. Is it possible to offer humanitarian assistance under these conditions? Is it possible to increase the protection of humanitarian professionals?
To address these risks, humanitarian organizations define security strategies adapted to their mandate, capacities and vulnerabilities. To do so, they conduct a context analysis and actor mapping, a proper risk diagnosis and continuous monitoring and surveillance of the situation, incidents and alerts. Once the desired approach, or the elements to be included in each type of strategy, has been decided, it is necessary to reflect it in a security plan, with clear procedures, staff training and follow-up of its implementation.
Table of contents:
Acceptance strategy is the most common approach
Most international cooperation organizations choose to prioritize a strategy of acceptance. This approach is based on proactively seeking the approval and cooperation of the local communities where they work and their authorities. Acceptance requires a long-term commitment and can be truly effective when the people affected by a crisis recognize and value the work of a humanitarian organization and contribute to protecting it by sharing information about potential risks and helping to create a safe environment.
For this strategy to be successful, it is necessary to ensure that all personnel behave appropriately and are perceived positively. The organization, as an institution, also has to generate trust, transparently showing what principles and values it follows, what it does and how it does it, and being proactive in collecting complaints from assisted persons and following up to resolve them. It is key to demonstrate neutrality and impartiality before local authorities and armed groups, offer ways of participation in the actions to the community, or ensure that our projects respond to priority needs for the population.
However, a strategy based solely on acceptance is not always sufficient for security in humanitarian action. For example, when an organization first arrives in a humanitarian context, it may be completely unfamiliar to the local population. In addition, it is difficult to build trust and closeness if there is a high turnover of staff (a frequent occurrence in emergency response), if the assisted population is mobile and constantly changing, or if there is a large number of humanitarian actors that the local population is unable to differentiate. In contexts of open armed conflict or very high risk, acceptance is often simply not enough. In such cases, humanitarian organizations adopt other strategies, in whole or in part: protection and deterrence.
Protection strategy helps to reduce vulnerability
The protection strategy attempts to reduce the vulnerability of the organization, and includes many possible measures. These protective measures may be complementary, to some extent, with an acceptance strategy, but if implemented carelessly, they may pose a barrier to closeness or collaboration with the community. For example, prohibiting vehicle access to outsiders may be very logical in most contexts, but if the refusal to transport a sick person from a community is perceived as discrimination, it may generate rejection and even a violent response and endanger the team.
Resources: equipment and personnel
Some protection measures are related to equipment: barbed wire fences, night lighting, alarms, walls, communications equipment adapted to the terrain (e.g. satellite phones when the normal network is not reliable throughout the territory), electricity generators if there are frequent power outages, 4×4 vehicles well adapted for use off paved roads, or equipping safe rooms for all personnel in case of hibernation with emergency supplies (first aid kits, flashlights, telephones, blankets, easily consumable non-perishable food, etc.).
The use of watchmen (unarmed) is also a common protective measure. They are not expected to be individuals who will risk their lives in the event of an attack, but who know how to implement key security procedures, report incidents, and serve as a point of contact with the community closest to the facility.
Mechanisms: procedures and coordination for information management
Other protective measures are more related to procedures: adequate human resources management (on occasions, staff dissatisfaction is the cause of information leaks and other security incidents), adequate cash handling and payment procedures, adequate vehicle fleet management systems, mandatory security training for all staff, curfew rules and strictly enforced movement limitations, communications protocols for travel, call chain procedures for reporting alerts and incidents, prohibition of outsiders from entering offices and vehicles without prior review, evacuation procedures, hibernation procedures, use of air transport if there is a significant risk of violence on the road, etc.
There are also important protective measures related to coordination with other actors. These include participation in humanitarian coordination forums and mechanisms (where information on security risks is shared), incident reporting, movement of multiple organizations in convoys, etc. In addition, collaborative frameworks (such as Saving Lives Together) are useful for security between international NGOs and UN agencies. Finally, there are NGOs such as INSO (International NGO Safety Organization) that provide security information, training, alerts and analysis and expert advice.
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Deterrence strategy is often a last resort
Finally, and as a last resort for security in humanitarian action, organizations may decide to adopt a deterrence strategy. This type of approach controls external threats with a counter-threat, such as withdrawing from the intervention area if it becomes insecure or if there are threats, the use of diplomatic pressure, or the use of armed guards and escorts.
These measures are not feasible for any organization (e.g. small NGOs), may add risks (e.g. of shootings) and, in any case, pose a significant barrier to community acceptance.
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External links
- GISF, Humanitarian Outcomes, 2024. The Evolution of Security Risk Management in the Humanitarian Space.
- ACH, MDM, HI, 2023. “The risks we face are beyond human comprehension”: Advancing the protection of humanitarian and health workers.
- European Interagency Security Forum, 2017. Security to go: a risk management toolkit for humanitarian aid agencies.
- IASC, 2015. Saving Lives Together: A Framework for Improving Security Arrangements Among IGOs, NGOs and UN in the Field.
- Spearin, 2001. Private Security Companies and Humanitarians: A Corporate Solution to Securing Humanitarian Spaces?
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