The 1994 Rwandan genocide and the birth of modern humanitarianism
- Page updated onJune 29, 2026
The genocide and major humanitarian crisis in Rwanda in 1994 was a turning point in the history of humanitarian action. First, it exposed the failures of the international community to prevent and stop genocide. In addition, it also exposed weaknesses in the preparedness, coordination and accountability of the humanitarian system in the face of complex emergencies, in which violence overlaps with large forced population displacements.
The evaluation of the humanitarian response to this crisis, together with analyses of interventions in other complex humanitarian crises such as Bosnia and Somalia, was a key factor in prompting a reform process that was already incipient and had taken significant steps in multiple directions.
Table of contents:
The 1994 Rwanda crisis and the evaluation of humanitarian response
Violence, genocide, forced population displacement and public health emergencies
The social and political tensions between Hutus and Tutsis, exacerbated during the Belgian colonial period (1916–1962) and following the declaration of independence in 1962, resulted in 1990 in a civil war that reached the most extreme levels of violence in 1994. On 6 April of that year, an attack (whose authorship has still not been clarified) ended the life of the head of government. This event served as a pretext for Hutu extremists to activate an already prepared extermination plan against the (minority) Tutsi population and against moderate Hutus, perceived as traitors (Storey, 1997). In just one hundred days, from April to June, the presidential guard, militias, local authorities and mobilised civilian population murdered between 500,000 and 800,000 Tutsis in systematic massacres. There was no coherent action by the international community to halt the genocide (Borton et al., 1996).
At the beginning of July, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, after three months of military confrontations, managed to regain power in the country, establishing a unity government. Fearing reprisals, more than two million people (mostly Hutus, including extremists, militia members and perpetrators of the genocide) fled to neighboring countries: Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire (today, the Democratic Republic of Congo). Among them, 850,000 fled across the northern border to Goma, concentrating with extraordinary speed in and around the city.
In the weeks that followed, Goma became the scene of a public health emergency of enormous proportions. Approximately 50,000 people (between 6% and 10% of the population) died in just the first month, mainly due to cholera and dysentery epidemics, aggravated by dehydration and violence. The volcanic rock terrain on which they were located made it difficult to drill wells, supply drinking water and install basic sanitation infrastructure. This, together with the overcrowding caused by an immediate and massive migratory flow, favoured the faecal-oral transmission of diseases. Humanitarian organisations were overwhelmed by the situation, which was also complicated by the extreme insecurity caused by the armed Hutu militias that controlled the makeshift camps (Goma Epidemiology Group, 1995).
Humanitarian response to a complex emergency: scale and characteristics
Once the emergency and the cholera outbreak in Goma had been declared, and driven by extensive media coverage, the international community threw itself into a large-scale humanitarian response. In addition to the international NGOs and United Nations agencies usually present in complex crises, a large multitude of actors joined in, including civil protection and disaster response agencies from donor countries, military contingents, and many other NGOs with less experience. They soon managed to distribute water and food and establish healthcare centres (Borton et al., 1996).
Inside Rwanda, the extreme violence that began in April 1994 posed a major obstacle to humanitarian aid, which was needed by thousands of internally displaced people. Only a few actors were able to operate, with great difficulty and risk, in the areas controlled by the perpetrators of the genocide. By contrast, in the areas that the Rwandan Patriotic Front gradually took control of, there was better humanitarian access (Parker, 2019). The courage and determination of organisations such as the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), MSF, the United Nations advance team, Caritas and the World Food Programme made it possible to avert famine. In the south-west of the country, a French military force was able to create a safe zone. Although this allowed for the protection of civilians in this area, it also attracted humanitarian actors who took time to establish operational capacity and diverted their attention from the more concentrated and less protected migratory flows in the north-west (Borton et al., 1996).
Tanzania received 200,000 people in April 1994 who were fleeing the genocide. There, the response was coordinated with great effectiveness by UNHCR, which had the initial support of the Tanzanian government. However, the migratory flow continued to increase in the following months and, when the Goma crisis occurred and international attention became concentrated there, the situation in Tanzania deteriorated. The water supply and infrastructure had not been planned for a response of this duration (Bradol & Le Pape, 2016).
In Burundi there was a lower density of refugees from Rwanda. Despite facing a highly violent and politically unstable context, UNHCR and some international NGOs were able to provide an effective humanitarian response (Bradol & Le Pape, 2016).
The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda and its findings
Due to the magnitude of the Rwanda crisis, an unprecedented multinational evaluation was launched at the end of 1994 to draw lessons that could be relevant to ongoing operations. One of the four studies that formed part of this evaluation, led by John Borton and published in 1996, focused on analysing the performance of the humanitarian system (Borton et al., 1996).
The study highlighted a fundamental weakness of the humanitarian system: the absence of mechanisms to monitor and analyze information on the evolution of the situation and to issue alerts in areas with almost no coverage by humanitarian agencies. The few organizations with response capacity in the midst of the violence offered partial and fragmented data. There were data and estimates from some organizations on people in need of assistance that did not reach other key organizations. At the same time, military operations were altering the dynamics of the crisis and response as they went along. While many actors were concentrated on the Tanzanian border and in the «safe zone» of southwestern Rwanda, in Goma there was barely a small remnant of personnel left, with a contingency plan for some 50,000 people, far fewer than eventually arrived. It was hoped that, should a more intensive humanitarian response be necessary, air assets could be activated quickly, but no assets or equipment were pre-positioned.
The situation in Goma could have been much worse had there not been a new multi-agency mission to assess needs in the northwest of the country just after the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and before the arrival of the large migratory flow. This allowed for an extraordinarily rapid mobilization, although initially insufficient for the scale of the crisis. The dependence on air transport was a logistical bottleneck, complicated also by the urgent shipment of some non-priority cargoes that did not correspond to what was requested. The need for heavy machinery, for example, was not met until September.
Similarly, it was not until March 1995 that the problem of insecurity and violence in the camps in Goma was addressed with the necessary priority, which made humanitarian action extremely difficult. There were also problems of coordination between important actors, creating duplication and leaving unmet needs.
Learning and recommendations for improved humanitarian action in complex crises
The joint evaluation revealed key problems, but also proposed recommendations and solutions (Borton et al., 1996). Among the priority issues were:
- The political vacuum of the international community to stop the extermination plans and genocide. The violence drove many humanitarian organizations out of Rwanda and persisted during the movements of refugees to camps in Goma and other border areas. Humanitarian organizations did what they could in an extremely high-risk scenario, but their staff were forced to leave the cholera treatment centers in the camps every night and it was impossible to ensure equitable food distribution, for example. All this showed that humanitarian action cannot be a substitute in complex emergencies for political, diplomatic and (in some cases) military action.
- The lack of investment in crisis preparedness. Donor risk aversion limited the funding of contingency plans for emergencies that might not occur, regardless of the fact that, if they did occur, rapid response would be too late. It was not only a matter of prepositioning essential goods, but also of mobilizing key technical and logistics personnel and preparing communication and transportation equipment.
- The importance of early warning mechanisms. In order to have useful contingency plans, it was also necessary to improve the flow of information and communication between agencies and with NGOs at all levels.
- The need to improve coordination among actors. Between 250 and 300 humanitarian organizations and more than 20 donors participated in the response in Rwanda and neighboring countries. UNHCR took the lead in responding to the displacement of refugees, with financial and institutional support. However, within Rwanda, coordination of the response was more fragmented. There, a temporary ad hoc Rwanda response coordination structure (UNREO) was established in April 1994, supported from abroad by the UN Department of Humanitarian Assistance. But it arrived late, lacked sufficient resources and experience in humanitarian coordination and did not have a clear relationship with the UN operational agencies and NGOs.
- The performance of NGOs and the accountability of the humanitarian system in general. The work and vital role of many NGOs was recognized, but the lack of professionalism, responsibility, technical coordination and rigor in accountability for impact and performance assessment of many others was also criticized. This underscored the need for a set of humanitarian standards (already under development by then) and their global dissemination. It also went so far as to suggest the creation of an accreditation system for NGOs and a humanitarian «ombudsman».
Effects and consequences of the joint evaluation of emergency assistance in Rwanda
The evaluation stressed that humanitarian action funding was used as a substitute for the political and military actions that could have halted the genocide. Despite this, subsequent reviews of compliance with these recommendations showed little progress in the prevention and suppression of genocides and mass human rights abuses (ALNAP, 2017).
As far as the humanitarian response is concerned, not all the recommendations had the desired effect, nor did all the subsequent changes in the humanitarian system coincide with the vision and proposals of the evaluation (Sphere, 2014). Some proposals were rejected outright, such as the recommendation to create a humanitarian "ombudsman", to combine the humanitarian functions of the different United Nations agencies into a single one, to have all humanitarian funding controlled by a neutral entity, or to establish an international accreditation system for humanitarian organisations, so that only those meeting certain requirements could register, receive work permits for their staff, or have import privileges in the countries of intervention (ALNAP, 2017).
However, many of the document's conclusions and proposals catalysed important changes and advances in accountability, humanitarian standards and professionalisation. They also helped to consolidate and sustain improvement initiatives that were already in progress, and whose importance was now placed beyond any doubt (ALNAP, 2017).
The Code of Conduct for Disaster Relief
The origin of the Code and its coincidence in time with the Rwandan genocide
In 1991, the French Red Cross proposed to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross the drafting of a code of conduct in humanitarian action (Walker, 2005). The Cold War had just ended, and the humanitarian system did not appear capable of providing quality assistance at scale in complex humanitarian crises, with a strong military and political backdrop. Many independent organisations, coming from work in rural development and natural disaster response, or lacking professionalism, had no experience in conflict situations.
The proposal was brought before the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, which entrusted its drafting to Peter Walker (IFRC) and Tony Vaux (Oxfam). In 1994 they published the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (SCHR, 1994), at the same time as the Rwandan genocide was taking place. This temporal proximity helped it to be perceived as an important tool for addressing the problems and lack of standards observed in that and other complex emergencies of the time.
The contents of the Code of Conduct: 10 ethical principles of conduct and 3 annexes
The Code of Conduct sought to establish standards of behaviour for all humanitarian organisations, based on the humanitarian principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (SCHR, 1994). Moreover, its first four ethical principles of conduct are essentially a reformulation of the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality (although the reformulation of this principle in article 3 is especially ambiguous) (Hilhorst, 2005). The following six principles of conduct, however, address other issues, such as respect for local culture, the strengthening of local capacities, the participation of beneficiaries, the reduction of vulnerabilities to future disasters, accountability and respect for the dignity of people in public information and communication activities.
In addition to this, the Code included three important annexes for policy advocacy (SCHR, 1994). Two of them appealed directly to governments to respect the independence and impartiality of non-governmental humanitarian agencies, facilitate access to affected people, assume their political responsibilities in the planning and coordination of aid, and comply with international humanitarian law. A third annex urged intergovernmental organisations (such as the United Nations) to support local humanitarian coordination and to recognise non-governmental humanitarian organisations as allies and partners, to protect them and give them access to the same information guaranteed to their own agencies. For many, however, these three important annexes remained in an invisible background (Terry, 2000a).
Impact and legacy of the 1994 Code of Conduct
The Code of Conduct, in reality, did not bring about a major immediate change in the way the organisations that signed it behaved, as Walker himself acknowledged years later (Sphere Project, 2015). In part, this was because it was voluntary and not legally binding. As a result, there were no clear mechanisms for accountability or for sanctioning violations of the Code. Furthermore, neither the grand declarations nor the dissemination of the Code by organisations to their staff translated into a coherent commitment and change. The Code of Conduct became an essential part of the induction processes for new staff, and was often consulted when updating organisations' strategic approaches, but was then kept in a drawer during programme implementation (Hilhorst, 2005). Nor did non-governmental organisations make sufficient use of the policy advocacy potential of the Code's annexes.
Another important criticism of the Code stems from its Western roots (Hilhorst, 2005), from the perspective of the headquarters of international organisations, with scarcely any consideration of the ideas and voices of local organisations (Omaar & de Waal, 1994). This, which also affected many other initiatives of the time, clashed with the emerging vision of a decolonised and localised humanitarian action.
In any case, the Code did play a key role in disseminating the humanitarian principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and solidifying a common normative basis for virtually all the heterogeneous actors of the humanitarian system, from NGOs to United Nations agencies (Sharpe, 2024). Furthermore, it also served to pave the way for the success of the Sphere Project, which years later would integrate the Code of Conduct into its essential chapters (Sphere Project, 2015). Many of its elements also served as a basis for the subsequent development of the Core Humanitarian Standard.
The Sphere Project: Effectiveness and Accountability in Humanitarian Action
What was the origin of the Sphere Project?
If the Code of Conduct addressed how to provide humanitarian assistance, the need suddenly arose to also reach a consensus on what it should consist of. In fact, there had already been some attempts in this direction. For example, the US NGO alliance InterAction had begun working in the early 1990s, under the coordination of Lisa Mullins, on a series of standards for civil society organisations. The "Humanitarianism and War" project, directed by Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, also played a key role in that period by promoting debate around humanitarian principles, operational dilemmas and the professionalisation of aid (Minear, 1988). These and other initiatives served as precursors to one more, which would end up having a far greater impact.
In 1995, Peter Walker, from the IFRC, and Nicholas Stockton, from Oxfam, sketched out the first outlines of a new project in Geneva, after many conversations about the internal and operational challenges of humanitarian response. From that concern arose the initiative, which would take off thanks to the support and enthusiasm of the organisations of the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response. Other alliances of organisations soon joined the project, such as ICVA, the US-based InterAction and the European VOICE, joining forces towards a common global objective that would come to be called the Sphere Project (Sphere Project, 2015).
The Sphere Project sought to answer a key question: what must humanitarian organisations guarantee to people affected by a crisis? Moreover, this question was framed from the perspective of these people, their rights and the minimum standards they would expect to receive to help them preserve their lives with dignity (Darcy, 2004). To find answers and successfully develop such an ambitious project, an effort was made to involve all possible actors, also seeking the support of more than ten humanitarian donors (Sphere Project, 2015). Sphere did not have the logo of any organisation stamped on it. It belonged to all those who felt the need to improve the effectiveness and accountability of humanitarian action.
The fact that Sphere was launched shortly after the Rwanda tragedy was a key factor in the project receiving almost global backing. It was a collective self-regulation effort by humanitarian organisations, in part also to pre-empt a possible recommendation from the joint evaluation of humanitarian action in Rwanda to create an external regulatory mechanism (Sphere, 2014). And it worked (ALNAP, 2017). Although the Rwanda evaluation team itself maintained its recommendation to create an international accreditation system (Borton et al., 1996), it recognised the value of the initiative, which ended up becoming the de facto standard of the sector.
The 1998 Sphere Handbook was received with great enthusiasm, but also with criticism
The first pilot version of the Sphere Handbook came out in 1998 (Sphere Project, 1998). For the most part, it was very well received. This was reflected in the rapid multiplication of translations of the handbook into many languages and in the great demand for Sphere training workshops in numerous contexts. There was a thirst for common technical standards (Sphere Project, 2015).
However, there was also criticism and even distancing from the project on the part of several humanitarian organisations, mainly French ones (Sphere Project, 2015). What if such a strong emphasis on technical standards ended up being used as a rigid recipe, understood as an end in itself, prioritised ahead of accountability to people? Where was the importance of protection addressed? (Terry, 2000a) Were the standards applicable to any context? How were the technical criteria linked to the Humanitarian Charter? How could humanitarian principles be effectively applied if no hierarchy was established between them? Finally, and above all, there was a fear that the Project would end up shifting the political responsibility for humanitarian crises and the burden of accountability from governments to humanitarian agencies (Darcy, 2004), and that the standards would become a mechanism of donor control over implementers (Tong, 2004).
Impact and relevance of the successive updates of the Sphere Handbook to date
Dissemination of the Sphere Handbook was not just a matter of making itself known. On the contrary, and always with the intention of making the project global and of the entire humanitarian system, exchanges of experiences were held on its applicability in numerous contexts and countries.
Over time, the new editions of the handbook (in 2000, 2004, 2011 and 2018) incorporated changes based on those discussions, improvements and an expansion of their contents, and even standards from other initiatives consistent with the project's vocation, such as the Core Humanitarian Standard. This evolution helped Sphere to overcome some of the initial limitations and to find its place in the humanitarian system, more as a reference than as a fixed norm (Sphere Project, 2015). Its role was also consolidated as a technical and normative foundation for policy advocacy before governments, which are responsible for creating a humanitarian space in which compliance with Sphere standards is possible.
The Sphere Project has introduced a common language to the humanitarian sector, becoming over the years a fundamental element of the identity and culture of many of its organizations. Sphere remains today a benchmark and a cornerstone for driving accountability and quality in humanitarian action, although there is still a long way to go in its operationalization and implementation.
The birth of new organizations: ALNAP, People in Aid, HAP, and OCHA
In the years following the Rwanda crisis, there were also strong institutional responses to the failures of the humanitarian system that had been identified in this and other complex emergencies: they had to do mainly with an interest in overcoming problems related to the lack of systematic learning, lack of accountability to populations in need of humanitarian assistance, and weaknesses in humanitarian coordination and leadership.
ALNAP: a commitment to systematic learning in the humanitarian system
Some of the people who participated in the evaluation of the humanitarian response in Rwanda, including John Borton, the director of the third study, decided to give continuity to the initiative. To this end they created a forum to discuss accountability and learning in the humanitarian system. This is how the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in humanitarian action (better known as ALNAP) was born in London in 1997 (Sphere, 2014).
Today ALNAP continues to be one of the most influential evidence and learning networks in the humanitarian system. Its reports and studies contribute to generating evidence on what works, how and why in humanitarian action, to improving evaluations of humanitarian projects and the overall performance of the sector, and to addressing new challenges that shake the foundations of the humanitarian system.
The birth of People In Aid and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
In 1995, a research project focused on the risks arising from the expansion in the number of NGOs and the need to professionalise their staff (Macnair, 1995). The study highlighted that humanitarian work and international development cooperation required a particular combination of skills and training, and that this was a determining factor in the quality and effectiveness of aid. For this reason, the organisations that carried out the study, a year later, published a code of good practice in the management and support of humanitarian workers, along with tools to enable the signatory organisations to assess their progress in relation to them. This initiative resulted in the creation of People in Aid, an organisation established to support humanitarian organisations wishing to improve the management of their staff (Sphere Project, 1998).
While People in Aid was consolidating its mandate, in 1997 a group of British organisations sought to advance the idea of a humanitarian "ombudsman" proposed in the joint evaluation of the international response to the genocide in Rwanda. This mechanism was conceived as an impartial and independent entity that could investigate complaints and abuses reported by the recipients of assistance and regulate the activities of NGOs that did not comply with their legal obligations and the established codes of practice. This proposal, complex in itself, was received with scepticism by many humanitarian actors who preferred to opt for self-regulation (following the model of the Sphere Project) (ALNAP, 2017).
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Although the idea of the humanitarian "ombudsman" did not prosper in its initially proposed form, it ended up evolving towards the creation of HAP International (Humanitarian Accountability Partnership) in 2003 (Sphere, 2014). It was a self-regulation initiative launched by humanitarian and development organisations and donors, to improve the accountability of humanitarian action to people affected by crises, thereby protecting their dignity and rights (Tong, 2004). In 2010 they published their standards on quality management and accountability and in 2014, the first edition of the Core Humanitarian Standard. Just one year later, People in Aid and HAP International merged into what is today the Core Humanitarian Standard Alliance (Sharpe, 2024).
The transformation of DHA into OCHA, to coordinate and lead the system
The Rwanda crisis exposed the limitations of the DHA (Department of Humanitarian Affairs) created by the United Nations Secretary-General in 1992. It highlighted the need for stronger and more capable leadership among the agencies (Borton et al., 1996).
In 1998, a United Nations reform programme was launched which, among other things, addressed this priority. The DHA became OCHA, which was given a clearer and more significant mandate around coordination, policy development and advocacy in humanitarian crises (Parker, 2019).
What about the principle of neutrality and its application in Rwanda?
The joint evaluation did not address the issue of humanitarian principles and their application in the response to the genocide and the refugee crisis in Goma. Its focus was on other things: effectiveness, coordination, logistics, information and political responsibilities. However, this complex crisis once again brought to the table important dilemmas regarding neutrality and its operationalisation (Terry, 2000b).
The genocide and extreme violence in Rwanda pushed the operational interpretation of the principle of neutrality to its limits
Some authors criticise the fact that, between April and July 1994, humanitarian organisations stressed the need for a ceasefire and the intervention of international United Nations troops, without giving support to the Rwandan Patriotic Front, when doing so was the only viable option for halting the genocide (Omaar & de Waal, 1994). They also criticise the fact that many organisations were unwilling to intervene inside Rwanda in the areas taken by the rebel army that was trying to halt the genocide, but then rushed to respond to the crisis of refugees fleeing to Tanzania or Zaire (Storey, 1997). Some reports estimated that among the 850,000 refugees there were 20,000 well-armed soldiers who had participated in killings, and who now controlled the camps, from which they could regroup and reactivate attacks. In Goma, while humanitarian personnel did everything possible to save lives in the midst of a terrible public health emergency and great insecurity, the perpetrators of the massacres took advantage of humanitarian assistance to obtain resources and security and to consolidate their power in exile (Bradol & Le Pape, 2016).
Over time, organisations such as MSF France, for example, decided to denounce the threats and the control and diversion of humanitarian aid by local military leaders and announced their withdrawal, frustrated by the inaction of the international community in prosecuting the genocide and in order to avoid being complicit in the vacuum of political responsibility (Parker, 2019). This decision, however, was not well received by other sections of the organisation, which did not consider it to be part of MSF's mandate to establish the guilt of alleged perpetrators of genocide, opening up an important debate (Bradol & Le Pape, 2016).
The experience of other organisations was different. The ICRC was already in Rwanda when the genocide began and had a unique mandate under International Humanitarian Law. That mandate allowed it to remain in the country when almost all other organisations evacuated their teams (Cotter & Palmieri, 2024). They maintained, as International Humanitarian Law required of them, a strict interpretation of neutrality and constant dialogue with all parties (including the perpetrators of the genocide). That was essential in order to operate in an environment of great violence, preserving access to the population that had been trapped and protecting the safety of their personnel. Circumstances, however, did force the ICRC to publicly denounce the violence selectively on several occasions (Cotter & Palmieri, 2024).
The debate, which is still open today, contributed to a more mature understanding of the principle of neutrality in the humanitarian system
The experience in Goma and the examples mentioned demonstrated the enormous operational dilemmas and normative tensions that humanitarian organisations face in armed conflicts. They also demonstrated that different organisations, making a coherent reading of their traditions, mandates, responsibilities and principles, could end up applying neutrality in different ways (Terry, 2000b).
The dilemmas of 1994 did not resolve the debate, but rather took it further and in greater depth into the beginning of the twenty-first century and in the years that followed. Today reflections on humanitarian principles and neutrality continue, the result of more conflicts, more humanitarian interventions, more mistakes, more successes, more self-criticism and more desire to learn and be accountable to the populations affected by violence.
References
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- Bradol, J.-H., & Le Pape, M. (2016). Les camps de réfugiés rwandais en Tanzanie et au Zaïre (1994–1995). En Génocide et crimes de masse: L’expérience rwandaise de MSF, 1982–1997. CNRS Éditions. https://msf-crash.org/fr/genocide-et-crimes-de-masse-lexperience-rwandaise-de-msf-1982-1997/chapitre-ii-les-camps-de
- Borton, J., Brusset, E., & Hallam, A. (1996). The international response to conflict and genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda experience. Study III: Humanitarian aid and effects. Overseas Development Institute. https://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/resource/joint-evaluation-emergency-assistance-rwanda-study-iii-principal-findings-and-0
- Cotter, C., & Palmieri, D. (2024). «A season in hell»: The Rwandan genocide and the ICRC’s Fundamental Principles. International Review of the Red Cross, 106(925), 301–323. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383124000341
- Darcy, J. (2004). Locating responsibility: The Sphere humanitarian charter and its rationale. Disasters, 28(2), 112–123. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0361-3666.2004.00247.x
- Hilhorst, D. (2005). Dead letter or living document? Ten years of the Code of Conduct for disaster relief. Disasters, 29(4), 351–369. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0361-3666.2005.00297.x
- Goma Epidemiology Group. (1995). Public health impact of Rwandan refugee crisis: What happened in Goma, Zaire, in July, 1994? The Lancet, 345(8946), 339–344. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/7646638/
- Macnair, R. (1995). Room for improvement: The management and support of relief and development workers (RRN Network Paper 10). Overseas Development Institute. https://odihpn.org/resources/room-for-improvement-the-management-and-support-of-relief-workers/
- Minear, L. (1988). Helping people in an age of conflict: Toward a new professionalism in U.S. voluntary humanitarian assistance. American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction). https://emu.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16154coll8/id/89/
- Omaar, R., & de Waal, A. (1994). Humanitarianism unbound? Current dilemmas facing multi-mandate relief operations in political emergencies (Discussion Paper No. 5). African Rights. https://www.csrf-southsudan.org/wp-content/uploads/1994/01/Humanitarianism_unbound_Current_dilemmas_facing-1.pdf
- Parker, B. (2019, April 8). Rwanda, part 2: What humanitarians need to remember 25 years on. The New Humanitarian. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2019/04/08/rwanda-part-2-what-humanitarians-need-remember-25-years
- Sharpe, M. (2024). It’s all relative: The origins, legal character and normative content of the humanitarian principles. International Review of the Red Cross, 106(925), 12–55. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383123000292
- Sphere. (2014). 20 years after the Rwandan Genocide: The unfinished accountability revolution. An interview with John Borton. https://spherestandards.org/20-years-after-rwandan-genocide/
- Sphere Project. (1998). The Sphere Project: Humanitarian charter and minimum standards in disaster response (Pilot version). https://spherestandards.org/handbook/editions/
- Sphere Project. (2015). The Sphere story: A video documentary. https://spherestandards.org/the-sphere-story-a-video-documentary/
- Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response. (1994). Code of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in disaster relief. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. https://www.ifrc.org/document/code-conduct-international-red-cross-and-red-crescent-movement-and-ngos-disaster-relief
- Storey, A. (1997). Non-neutral humanitarianism: NGOs and the Rwanda crisis. Development in Practice, 7(4), 384–394. https://doi.org/10.1080/09614529754170
- Terry, F. (2000a, October 1). The limits and risks of regulation mechanisms for humanitarian action. Médecins Sans Frontières CRASH. https://msf-crash.org/en/humanitarian-actors-and-practices/limits-and-risks-regulation-mechanisms-humanitarian-action
- Terry, F. (2000b, December). The principle of neutrality: Is it relevant to MSF? [Discussion paper]. Médecins Sans Frontières. https://www.msf.fr/sites/www.msf.fr/files/2000-12-01-Terry.pdf
- Tong, J. (2004). Questionable accountability: MSF and Sphere in 2003. Disasters, 28(2), 176–189. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0361-3666.2004.00251.x
- Walker, P. (2005). Cracking the code: The genesis, use and future of the Code of Conduct. Disasters, 29(4), 323–336. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0361-3666.2005.00295.x
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Abarca, B. (June 29, 2026). The 1994 Rwandan genocide and the birth of modern humanitarianism. Salud Everywhere. https://saludeverywhere.com/en/humanitarian-aid-and-international-development/humanitarian-reform-after-the-1994-rwanda-crisis/