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Darfur, the Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2005 humanitarian reform

  • Page updated onJuly 29, 2026
Photography: Bruno Abarca
Text and photo: Bruno Abarca

After the 1994 Rwanda crisis, the humanitarian system had driven significant progress in standards and accountability. A decade later, however, in a context shaped by the politicisation of aid that followed 9/11, two almost opposite crises once again laid bare its structural weaknesses: Darfur, forgotten and underfunded, with sectoral gaps that nobody took on, and the Indian Ocean tsunami emergency, overwhelmed by a flood of resources and actors without coordination.

Building on the diagnosis set out in the Humanitarian Response Review, the 2005 humanitarian reform introduced significant changes in coordination, with the cluster system and the strengthening of humanitarian leadership, and in financing, with the overhaul of the CERF and country-based pooled funds, although many of the underlying problems remained unresolved.

Darfur and the Indian Ocean tsunami exposed the failures of the humanitarian system

Between 2003 and 2005, the humanitarian crises that occurred, such as those in Darfur (Sudan) and the Indian Ocean tsunami, among others, revealed that the humanitarian system still had major shortcomings in coordination and equitable financing.

In contradiction with the ideological commitment of humanitarianism, according to which all lives are worth the same, while one emergency attracted record levels of humanitarian financing, other complex crises with less media attention were left almost entirely unattended. Moreover, in underfunded crises as much as in those where excess brought problems of its own, coordination between actors to ensure an efficient, relevant and coherent response remained inadequate.

Darfur (2003-2005): a forgotten crisis, with gaps and no one responsible

In early 2003, two rebel groups from Darfur, a region in western Sudan with around 6 million inhabitants, took up arms against the central government in Khartoum, claiming political marginalisation and economic neglect of non-Arab populations. The government responded by mobilising its army and by supporting and arming local militias in a civil conflict that caused the internal displacement of 1.65 million people within Darfur and 200,000 refugees in Chad (UN Security Council, 2005), and the deaths of some 300,000 people, although estimates vary considerably (Degomme & Guha-Sapir, 2010).

The central government and the militias were accused by a United Nations Commission of systematically committing war crimes and crimes against humanity (UN Security Council, 2005). In June 2005 the International Criminal Court opened an investigation that led to numerous charges of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide (ICC, n.d.).

Many of the organisations involved in the humanitarian response to this crisis, such as UNHCR, UNICEF, DFID, OCHA, MSF Holland, Oxfam GB/International and CARE International, evaluated their interventions to assess whether lessons learned in the past had been taken into account and to improve present and future performance in this type of response (Minear, 2005). Important conclusions emerged from these analyses:

  • There was a major delay in launching and scaling up the humanitarian response to the level required. It was described as a "systemic failure" by Mark Bowden, then head of policy at OCHA (Giesen & Stevenson, 2005). By May 2003 there were already half a million displaced people, but it was not until February-May 2004 that the United Nations mobilised on any significant scale. UNICEF's activities, for example, were not consolidated until October 2004, by which time 18 months had passed since the start of the emergency and the situation continued to deteriorate, reaching a high risk of famine (Minear, 2005). The delay was due to difficulties in monitoring the population's needs, pressure on humanitarian space and the barriers to humanitarian access imposed by the authorities in Khartoum, together with a lack of financial resources at a time when donor interest was focused on Afghanistan and Iraq. Of the total of 2,637 million dollars requested by OCHA for the coordinated humanitarian response plans of 2004 and 2005 in Sudan (not only for Darfur), only 1,573 million were received, 60% (OCHA, n.d.).
  • There were significant problems with humanitarian coordination. The post of United Nations humanitarian coordinator in Darfur was held by many different people and also remained vacant for long periods. NGO efforts to share information and minimise duplication would have benefited from a better central coordination mechanism to help allocate the scarce resources available according to the severity of needs rather than the ease of access. UNICEF took on responsibility for coordinating technical sectors without having the technical capacity to do so until July-September 2004.
  • The lack of a focal point for the management of internally displaced persons camps stood out. UNHCR had no mandate over them and declined to take on the responsibility. OCHA identified NGOs to assume it, but some lacked experience, which led to wide disparities in the quality of services between camps. Although OCHA signed an agreement with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to provide technical assistance to these NGOs, this was not enough.
  • Protection gained weight, but resources were insufficient. The population's high exposure to abuse, human rights violations and gender-based violence underlined the importance of protection for affected people. This encouraged cooperation between humanitarian organisations and human rights organisations, although balancing the two proved difficult given the scarcity of resources available to cover basic needs (Giesen & Stevenson, 2005).
  • Not all organisations managed to navigate the obstacles imposed by the central government. Pressure from the Sudanese government had clear effects on humanitarian mobilisation. It imposed many restrictions and bureaucratic requirements on NGOs and agencies that narrowed humanitarian space. In some cases it encouraged or allowed armed attacks against humanitarian personnel (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Some NGOs managed to navigate these political pressures and negotiate the necessary permits, but other NGOs and United Nations agencies simply concentrated their work in government-controlled areas. Many humanitarian organisations stepped up their advocacy in an attempt to prevent more emphasis being placed on humanitarian assistance than on political solutions to the conflict, a problem already denounced in earlier crises such as Rwanda in 1994.

The Indian Ocean tsunami (December 2004): financing without coordination

On 26 December 2004, a large-magnitude undersea earthquake off the western coast of Sumatra unleashed a major tsunami in the Indian Ocean that reached the shores of more than 14 countries, particularly Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and Thailand, taking the lives of 227,000 people and forcing the displacement of 1.7 million people.

On this occasion, public pressure and media attention helped to reach, in a very short time, a record figure of humanitarian financing to respond to the crisis: 13.5 billion dollars. Alongside private donations from a great many people moved by the disaster, the crisis also resulted in a kind of "beauty contest between donors", in which they competed to make the largest possible pledge to help the tsunami's victims. Although not all pledges were ultimately honoured, the fact is that the tsunami response faced neither budgetary constraints nor the usual dilemmas in humanitarian action about how to prioritise scarce resources (Telford & Cosgrave, 2007).

Having sufficient humanitarian financing, access to the new technical and operational standards set out in the then-young Sphere Handbook, or the ability to operate in a politically stable context, however, guaranteed nothing. Far from being exceptionally good, the humanitarian response revealed significant shortcomings (Telford & Cosgrave, 2007):

  • Financing did not go to the actors with the greatest capacity. Donors gave priority to funding organisations from their own countries, regardless of their capacity and effectiveness, and occasionally bypassed United Nations mechanisms. This led to a proliferation of actors with insufficient operational experience, competence and capacity, but with abundant funds and no incentive to withdraw if they were not needed.
  • There was little interest in coordination and quality. There was no financial incentive to take part in mechanisms for coordinating action, to work jointly in consortia of several organisations, to assess the population's needs rigorously before determining what the response would consist of, or to ensure adequate information and accountability to affected populations.
  • Little attention was paid to the recovery and reconstruction phases. Emergency response was prioritised. However, once this phase ended, it became clear that many of the actors had neither the competence nor the experience to address the population's needs in the crisis's later stages.
  • International organisations ignored the capacity of local organisations and communities. Many international agencies did not work with local actors in the early stages of the response. By the time they turned to them for long-term recovery, they had already lost strength and capacity. Likewise, national civic initiative and community participation, key from the very first moments of the emergency, were soon pushed aside by the enormous influx of international organisations with vast resources.

In early 2005, more than 40 United Nations agencies, donors and NGOs formed the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), with the aim of rigorously evaluating the response with self-criticism and transparency (Telford et al., 2006). This exercise identified important recommendations, such as reorienting the international response towards supporting affected communities in leading their own response, improving accountability, establishing a solid basis for coordination and information management among international organisations, and increasing the efficiency and impartiality of humanitarian funding.

The Humanitarian Response Review and the birth of the 2005 humanitarian reform

Jan Egeland's arrival and the push for a reform of the humanitarian system

In December 2003, Jan Egeland, appointed just four months earlier as United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), presented to the Security Council the challenges facing the humanitarian system at that time (Egeland, 2003). In a period shaped by the global security agenda, Egeland spoke of humanitarian access and protection in Uganda, DR Congo and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, of attacks on aid workers in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Chechnya, of sexual violence in conflict, and of internally displaced people in Liberia, Colombia and Angola, among other challenges.

A year later, in December 2004, Egeland addressed the Security Council once again (Egeland, 2004). On this occasion, besides updating the situation and progress on access, protection and security, he highlighted the importance of the "forgotten emergencies" of Sudan, Iraq and Somalia, underfunded and overshadowed by the crises that drew more media attention. Little did Egeland know that, only a few days later, the Indian Ocean tsunami would underline this inequity in the most drastic way possible.

The ERC used the closing of his address to the United Nations Security Council to announce something more: the launch of a review of the humanitarian response in the areas of assistance and protection, aimed at strengthening the global capacity of the humanitarian system (Egeland, 2004). In doing so, he planted the seed of a humanitarian reform that would begin in 2005 and would transform the way humanitarian action is led, coordinated and funded.

From the Humanitarian Response Review to the humanitarian reform

The Humanitarian Response Review commissioned by Jan Egeland began in February 2005 and was published in August that same year. It was a comprehensive independent evaluation identifying why the humanitarian system sometimes fell short of its goals, which weaknesses were holding back its capacities and what changes were needed to ensure better and faster humanitarian responses (Adinolfi et al., 2005).

This global review of the humanitarian system analysed the capacities of the United Nations, NGOs, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and other humanitarian organisations, as well as their performance in natural disasters and complex humanitarian crises from the fourth week to 18 months into the intervention, that is, beyond initial emergency relief. It also sought to put forward solutions capable of achieving the consensus needed between humanitarian organisations and donors to bring about real change.

The report highlighted problems such as organisations' lack of preparedness for the rapid deployment of human resources in emergencies, weaknesses in protection and specific gaps in the capacities of each humanitarian sector. But it did not stop there. On the contrary, the report went deeper into the need for a new shared vision of humanitarian response coordination, and for the rapid mobilisation of adequate and flexible emergency humanitarian funding. 

It was in these two areas, humanitarian coordination and funding, that a series of subsequent documents and initiatives, prompted by the recommendations of the Humanitarian Response Review, would bring about major changes affecting the entire system.

The cluster system and humanitarian leadership

The 2005 Humanitarian Response Review identified weaknesses in humanitarian coordination systems and mechanisms

Some of the problems identified by this evaluation (Adinolfi et al., 2005) related to the fragmentation of the system into groups and the absence of a common umbrella. Although the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) existed to fill that role, its decisions were not binding and this limited the authority of its mandate in the field. Moreover, in practice the IASC did not represent all humanitarian actors, who were grouped into three almost parallel systems. One was that of the United Nations, another that of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and a third mechanism, in the form of multiple networks and mechanisms, brought together the NGOs. This fragmentation prevented productive collaboration between them all.

At sector level, the idea of having a lead organisation for each sector was viewed favourably. However, the practical foundations of that leadership were missing: solid terms of reference, with clear obligations and accountability. A model existed that appeared to work, but it still needed to be scaled up in an organised way.

OCHA, whose management systems and structures had been updated only the previous year, struggled to mobilise agencies and organisations to cover certain operational needs, such as taking on responsibility for assistance to internally displaced people. It was also expected to provide more support and backing to the 21 Humanitarian Coordinators in different countries who, unlike the ERC, were in some cases not so well regarded. Their performance varied considerably according to their experience and skills and, when it was poor or when their closeness to national authorities compromised their impartiality or independence, it discouraged actors outside the United Nations from taking part in humanitarian coordination. In general, they also lacked key tools and clear procedures beyond joint needs assessments, which were beginning to become a reality in some contexts.

From diagnosis to recommendations and changes to improve humanitarian coordination

The Humanitarian Response Review put forward a series of concrete recommendations (Adinolfi et al., 2005):

  • Designating lead organisations for the sectors that needed them, and especially for the protection of internally displaced people.
  • Empowering the IASC, creating joint forums with NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and establishing a Field Humanitarian Team in each country.
  • Reviewing the selection and training process for Humanitarian Coordinators and their roles, and establishing the criteria needed for a Resident Coordinator to take on the role of Humanitarian Coordinator without difficulty.
  • Providing OCHA offices in each country with mechanisms and tools, to strengthen their capacities for preparedness, planning, needs assessment and resource mobilisation.

On 12 September 2005, the IASC Principals, that is, the heads of the organisations making up the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, met in Geneva (IASC, 2005b). At this meeting, drawing on the momentum of a simultaneous United Nations reform aimed at addressing the Millennium Development Goals (IASC, 2005d), a humanitarian reform was proposed to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response, which included one major innovation: the humanitarian cluster system (IASC, 2005a).

The humanitarian cluster system proposed in September 2005 was adopted in December of that same year 

Initially, nine clusters or sectoral groups were proposed: nutrition, water and sanitation, health, camp coordination and management, emergency shelter, protection, logistics, telecommunications and early recovery. Each was to be established at national and global level and had a lead organisation. This was a United Nations agency (UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR, WFP, UNDP and OCHA), responsible for ensuring preparedness and response to humanitarian emergencies, working with all other relevant actors and providing sectoral technical support to the country's Humanitarian Coordinator. Although lead organisations were not responsible for carrying out the activities themselves, they did take on the role of provider of last resort (IASC, 2005b).

The implementation of the clusters was to begin in several humanitarian emergencies in 2006 (IASC, 2005c). The analysis of lessons learned during this pilot experience resulted in a guidance note for implementation setting out how coordination, leadership and accountability in the new system should work across all main humanitarian sectors, including the responsibilities and terms of reference for the lead organisations of each cluster (IASC, 2006).

It also set out a clear explanation of "provider of last resort", a commitment by each cluster's lead organisation that was considered critical to the system's success, but also controversial, since it depended on external funding, unimpeded humanitarian access and security conditions, precisely the factors under which the need for a provider of last resort is most acute (IASC, 2006). A short additional guidance note in 2008 completed the clarification of this concept and the responsibilities it entailed (IASC, 2008).

More predictable and equitable humanitarian funding

The Humanitarian Response Review identified problems with humanitarian funding that was inadequate, late and inflexible 

Among the many problems with funding for humanitarian responses set out in the 2005 review were the following (Adinolfi et al., 2005):

  • International humanitarian organisations were extremely dependent on government donors, at around 80%-100%.
  • Despite the commitment adopted by many donors in the 2003 Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, it remained voluntary, and so had failed to make humanitarian funding more predictable or to guarantee equitable support to forgotten humanitarian emergencies, or to protracted crises with little media attention.
  • Although humanitarian assistance needs were growing, the volume of humanitarian funding remained flat, was tied to specific interventions, was mobilised in short cycles and was barely directed towards crisis preparedness or strengthening organisations' capacities. 
  • There was a tension between prioritising humanitarian funding for responses grounded in sound needs assessments and donors' reluctance to invest in them. 
  • Despite the existence of a Central Emergency Revolving Fund (UN General Assembly, 1991), its effectiveness was limited. Agencies were reluctant to use it in forgotten or low-profile crises, since the fund worked as a loan system to be repaid with voluntary donor contributions that might never arrive. With a ceiling of just 50 million dollars and slow disbursement procedures, it could not provide sufficient resources quickly. Its use was also limited to United Nations agencies and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

The CERF and Country-Based Pooled Funds for humanitarian funding

The main change introduced by the 2005 humanitarian reform in the funding of humanitarian response was the overhaul of the CERF and the push for country-based pooled funds, which until then had been used only in isolated cases.

In December 2005, the United Nations General Assembly (UN General Assembly, 2005) decided to transform the Central Emergency Revolving Fund into the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and to include in it a grant component that would make the response to humanitarian crises more predictable and timely, with an annual target of 450 million dollars, in addition to the 50 million dollars in loans (UN General Assembly, 2007).

In addition to the CERF, the 2005 humanitarian reform also gave impetus to Country-Based Pooled Funds, by recommending the progressive introduction of these mechanisms and urging donors to channel funds through these common appeals managed by the Humanitarian Coordinator (Adinolfi et al., 2005).

The limits and weaknesses of the 2005 humanitarian reform

A stronger coordination structure built around the United Nations, with significant gaps

The first evaluations of the new humanitarian cluster approach concluded that, after a turbulent start to its implementation, it had helped to improve humanitarian response coordination, with differences between the various countries where it had been tested. Overall, coverage of assistance had improved and the capacity to mobilise resources had increased, duplication and needs left uncovered by any actor had been reduced, and leadership was more organised and predictable. In addition, the entry of NGOs as co-leads and co-facilitators reduced the fragmentation of the system (Steets et al., 2010).

However, the system was immature, with global clusters that still had little capacity, significant unresolved questions regarding the provider of last resort (Stoddard et al., 2007), and leaders who failed to draw out their full potential (NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project, 2009). Beyond this, a negative effect was also denounced: local and national organisations were largely excluded from coordination mechanisms, and were weakened as a result (Steets et al., 2010).

Organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières were openly critical of a reform they viewed as an internal United Nations process (MSF, 2006). Moreover, they refused to take part in the humanitarian clusters, to be placed under the responsibility of the Humanitarian Coordinators, or to be accountable to them. This was not just a matter of doubts about the effectiveness of the model, but also a clash with their own principle of independence and the way they understood humanitarian coordination and its objectives. According to MSF, trying to get a myriad of humanitarian actors with different objectives and identities to work in perfect synergy was unrealistic and even dangerous, as it would reduce the diversity of approaches and solutions in highly politicised contexts (MSF, 2006).

A new humanitarian financing mechanism that excludes key actors

As for improvements in financing, the CERF received 299 million dollars in its first year. In 2007 it received 386 million, reaching 5% of total global humanitarian financing, and in 2008 it continued to grow. But the new mechanism still excluded NGOs, which could not access an instrument that only reinforced financing for the United Nations agencies (Stoddard, 2008).

Country-based funds, for their part, appeared to contribute to improved strategic planning, prioritisation, and coordination, but their effect in increasing contributions was less evident, adding little added value. It would still take years for them to consolidate, strengthen, and become a powerful mechanism of humanitarian financing.

A humanitarian reform that would be followed by many others

The humanitarian system continued to evolve, now with a stronger coordination and financing architecture, one that concentrated power and resources in the United Nations system, followed at a distance by international NGOs and, further still, by national NGOs — a problem that persists decades later.

Also left unaddressed or unresolved were important aspects relating to the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinators, the way joint needs assessments were carried out, and the responsibility of accountability to affected populations. All these problems would gradually come to light in subsequent humanitarian crises and would be the subject of later improvement initiatives and reforms, with relative success.

References

History and evolution of humanitarian aid

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How to cite this page

Abarca, B. (July 29, 2026). Darfur, the Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2005 humanitarian reform. Salud Everywhere. https://saludeverywhere.com/en/humanitarian-aid-and-international-development/2005-humanitarian-reform/

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