9/11, the War on Terror and humanitarian action
- Page updated onJune 12, 2026
The 1994 Rwanda humanitarian crisis exposed the limitations of the humanitarian system and prompted profound reflection on the quality, principles and political role of humanitarian action. A new, less neutral and more politicised humanitarianism began to take shape. Despite the existence of critics and detractors, the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent War on Terror ultimately forced the politicisation of aid to unintended extremes.
The article traces this transformation, its consequences for the shrinking of humanitarian space and how it laid the groundwork for the reforms that would follow, which were equally fundamental to the history of humanitarian action.
Table of contents:
Humanitarian action at the dawn of the twenty-first century: between politicisation and principles
Calls for a new, less neutral humanitarianism
As the new millennium began, the end of the Cold War was already receding into the past. From its ashes and from the mistakes and lessons of the previous decade, a new humanitarianism was emerging (Fox, 2001). This new humanitarianism was born with a strong sense of rupture with humanitarian principles (especially neutrality) and a defence of a more politically conscious humanitarian action, enabling links between humanitarian aid, development, the promotion of human rights and coherence with the global security agenda (Macrae & Leader, 2000).
Among the most notable changes in this shift towards a new humanitarianism was the rejection of the principle of neutrality. This was due, in large part, to the immorality of silence in the face of human rights violations and war crimes during the Rwanda and Bosnia crises of the previous decade. There were also, however, practical considerations: how could a single set of principles be upheld when the number of civil and military organisations with humanitarian mandates was multiplying, each with different levels of ethical maturity and using the same words with different meanings? And was it even possible to maintain neutrality in the midst of violent disputes between armed groups and in highly politicised complex humanitarian emergencies? (Slim, 1997)
Other voices, however, warned of the dangers of a politicised humanitarianism, pointed to the impossibility of predicting the long-term impact of humanitarian interventions, and denounced the ethical problems of speaking of deserving and undeserving victims of humanitarian assistance (Stockton, 1998).
Humanitarianism without borders
At the same time, from the tradition of humanitarianism without borders, represented by MSF, neutrality was criticised not in order to politicise aid, but to preserve the autonomy of humanitarian organisations and their capacity to bear witness to injustice and to insist on political accountability.
MSF received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999. James Orbinski, its international president, was very clear when accepting the award: "The humanitarian act is the most apolitical of all acts, but if its actions and its morality are taken seriously, it has the most profound of all political implications." (Orbinski, 1999)
In any case, the attacks of 11 September 2001 and above all the subsequent War on Terror soon imposed a forced instrumentalisation of humanitarian action, further amplifying the voices of those who defended respect for humanitarian principles in the face of politicisation.
9/11 and the War on Terror: a new landscape for humanitarian action
On 11 September 2001, Al-Qaeda carried out four attacks against the United States, killing 2,977 and leaving thousands injured.
In the immediate aftermath, the United States, under the administration of George W. Bush, responded with a major offensive against what it identified as the primary source of these attacks: terrorist groups and the fragile states in which they proliferated. This offensive, commonly referred to for years as the "War on Terror", consisted primarily of unilateral military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries (Thieux, 2006).
Alongside the invasions and military interventions, the War on Terror triggered a series of significant changes in Western foreign policy. These changes, driven by the main donor countries of international aid, had major consequences for the humanitarian system and for the reduction of the humanitarian space in which its organisations operate (Collinson & Elhawary, 2012).
The major powers sought to subordinate humanitarian action to the new global security agenda, in many cases blurring the lines that separated it from political and military interventions.
The instrumentalisation of humanitarian action subordinated to political objectives
The "coherence" ideas of the 1990s gave way to humanitarian action absorbed by security agendas in the 2000s
The links between humanitarian action and politics that had been so actively promoted in the previous decade took on an enormous dimension in the years following 9/11. The United Nations proposals in favour of an integrated vision of human security (Boutros-Ghali, 1992), or the policies adopted by the governments of some donor countries to integrate humanitarian action within their foreign policy framework (Macrae & Leader, 2000) now took on a far more polarised new meaning.
This was clearly illustrated by Bush's "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists", delivered on 20 September 2001. Although directed at foreign nations (Bush, 2001), it also suffocated any possibility of neutrality in humanitarian action.
Until the 1990s, security was understood primarily in terms of protecting state sovereignty from external military aggression. Now, however, it was recognised that issues such as poverty, hunger and disease were also threats to social peace and the stability of the world order (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Under this vision, humanitarian action could be strategic in addressing the root causes of a conflict, and so suddenly received renewed attention in the wake of the 9/11 attacks (Farer, 2003).
The politicisation of aid also led to its militarisation
Humanitarian action was adopted by military and political leaders as a strategic tool and a "force multiplier", at times essential to the success of military interventions (Lischer, 2007). This politicisation of aid manifested itself in very concrete ways. On one hand, donor countries funded NGOs to deliver humanitarian action in countries affected by conflict, considered threats to global stability, and for populations living under hostile regimes such as those of Sudan or North Korea. On the other hand, and at the same time, the armed forces themselves were carrying out activities of a humanitarian nature (Lischer, 2007).
Possibly the most extreme example of this militarisation can be found in the war in Afghanistan, launched in 2001 in response to the 9/11 attacks. There, military aircraft simultaneously dropped bombs on military targets and food aid to the civilian population (Lischer, 2007). There are also reports of how armed soldiers from the US-led coalition wore civilian clothing to distribute aid while simultaneously making contact with the local population (de Torrenté, 2002). A third example could be that of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, deployed by the United States following the overthrow of the Taliban government with the aim of rebuilding infrastructure. These teams consisted of between 60 and 100 soldiers, humanitarian workers and civil affairs officers, all mixed together (Lischer, 2007).
This type of assistance, although often labelled as humanitarian, is not humanitarian action in the strict sense established by the Geneva Conventions, as it is neither neutral, independent nor impartial. This, together with its limited effectiveness and the threat it posed to the acceptance and security of genuinely humanitarian organisations and their staff, drew extensive criticism from NGOs (de Torrenté, 2002). The consequences, indeed, were not long in coming.
The consequences of the politicisation of aid: a shrinking humanitarian space
Humanitarian organisations, more exposed to attacks
In August 2003, a suicide car bomb attack targeting the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad claimed the lives of 23 people, among them Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in Iraq. Two months later, in October 2003, suicide bombers detonated an ambulance packed with explosives at the Baghdad headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross, an organisation recognised for its neutrality, with a mandate acknowledged by International Humanitarian Law, and a track record of several years providing assistance in Iraq (de Torrenté, 2004).
The attack on the ICRC left an uncomfortable and troubling question hanging in the air: if an organisation recognised for its respect of humanitarian principles was not safe from attack, which organisation was? The efforts of countries such as the United States to associate humanitarian assistance with their political objectives had made it impossible for humanitarian organisations to distinguish themselves from military action and to provide impartial assistance based solely on needs (de Torrenté, 2004).
These were not the only attacks, nor the only organisations targeted. In 2003, 13 humanitarian workers were killed in Afghanistan. The number rose to 24 in 2004 and 31 in 2005 (Lischer, 2007). Although it is not easy to draw firm conclusions about the reality of the shrinking of humanitarian space during this period — since it also coincided with an increase in humanitarian personnel in conflict zones — many humanitarian organisations found themselves forced to choose between withdrawing and cancelling their programmes or working under armed protection (Collinson & Elhawary, 2012). Although many paused their activities at specific moments, the humanitarian imperative and the increase in available humanitarian funding led to a shift in approach in volatile contexts: from avoiding risk to managing it with security strategies beyond mere acceptance, and often to transferring that risk to subcontracted local organisations.
Counter-terrorism measures restrict humanitarian action
The events of 9/11 also drove the adoption of counter-terrorism measures. Some of these measures had a significant impact on humanitarian organisations, as they were designed to prevent a portion of funds intended for humanitarian action from ending up in the hands of armed groups. The rigidity of some of these measures and the lack of specificity in others forced humanitarian organisations to dedicate large amounts of resources, time and staff to documenting their strict compliance.
In other cases, however, the problem was even greater. This occurred when donor regulations required humanitarian organisations to share information about their staff and local partners, who perceived the requirement as invasive and accusatory. It also happened when the threat of sanctions blocked transparency in communication and coordination between actors (Pantuliano et al., 2011). This pressure, in some cases, led many humanitarian actors to reduce or halt their activities in highly volatile areas controlled by armed groups, despite the needs of the local population (Burniske et al., 2014).
Humanitarian funding, conditioned by belligerent donors
The relatively new and expanding humanitarian system was unable to maintain its independence from the security and stability objectives of the foreign policies of donors who were taking part in the conflicts. This, however, occurred with great asymmetry. While some NGOs maintained a degree of separation from the dominant political powers (MSF, for example, refused funding from belligerent governments in a conflict), others already had a significant financial dependence on US public funds.
In 2001, more than half of the funding of major humanitarian NGOs such as CARE, Save the Children US and IRC came from the United States government (Stoddard, 2003). When private humanitarian funding contracted following 9/11, dependence on public funding deepened, and many NGOs of Wilsonian tradition accepted the new political reality and their interdependence with the US administration with relative ease.
In 2003, the Swedish government promoted the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, in an attempt at donor self-regulation and accountability. However, although this initiative reaffirmed the importance of the humanitarian principle of independence, it did so in a deliberately weak manner and failed to bring about any meaningful change against the dominant logic of the politicisation of aid (Macrae & Harmer, 2004). Shortly afterwards, in 2005, the humanitarian system would embark on its first major reform. However, neither this nor subsequent transformations would succeed in fully reversing the erosion of humanitarian space that the War on Terror had accelerated. Many of those problems persist today.
🧠 Let's pause and reflect
Can there be an agreement between states and humanitarian organisations that guarantees the independence of the latter without eliminating the former's interest in funding them?
- Think and write your answer.
- Click on «Copy and open».
- Paste to receive feedback.
📚 This is the NotebookLM for this topic. It uses only carefully selected references. | What is NotebookLM?
References
- Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping (DPI/1247). United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/145749
- Burniske, J., Modirzadeh, N., & Lewis, D. (2014, November). Counter-terrorism laws and regulations: What aid agencies need to know (HPN Network Paper No. 79). Humanitarian Practice Network, Overseas Development Institute. https://odihpn.org/content/uploads/2014/11/NP_79_crc_string_FINAL.pdf
- Bush, G. W. (2001, September 20). Address before a joint session of the Congress on the United States response to the terrorist attacks of September 11. U.S. Government Publishing Office. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1140.pdf
- Collinson, S., & Elhawary, S. (2012). Humanitarian space: A review of trends and issues (HPG Report 32). Overseas Development Institute. https://odi.org/en/publications/humanitarian-space-a-review-of-trends-and-issues/
- de Torrenté, N. (2002, September). The war on terror’s challenges to humanitarian action. Médecins Sans Frontières. https://www.msf.fr/sites/default/files/2002-09-19-Torrente.pdf
- de Torrenté, N. (2004). Humanitarian action under attack: Reflections on the Iraq War. Harvard Human Rights Journal, 17, 1–30. https://journals.law.harvard.edu/hrj/wp-content/uploads/sites/83/2020/06/17HHRJ1-Torrente.pdf
- Farer, T. J. (2003). Humanitarian intervention before and after 9/11: Legality and legitimacy. In J. L. Holzgrefe & R. O. Keohane (Eds.), Humanitarian intervention: Ethical, legal, and political dilemmas (pp. 53–90). Cambridge University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/humanitarian-intervention/humanitarian-intervention-before-and-after-911-legality-and-legitimacy/9541F8AA60DACF74426970D9DDAAFCAE
- Fox, F. (2001). New humanitarianism: Does it provide a moral banner for the 21st century? Disasters, 25(4), 275–289. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7717.00178
- Lischer, S. K. (2007). Military intervention and the humanitarian «force multiplier.» Global Governance, 13(1), 99–118. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800644
- Macrae, J., & Leader, N. (2000). Shifting sands: The search for coherence between political and humanitarian responses to complex emergencies (HPG Report No. 8). Overseas Development Institute. https://media.odi.org/documents/299.pdf
- Macrae, J., & Harmer, A. (2004, March 2). Good humanitarian donorship: A mouse or a lion?. Overseas Development Institute. https://odi.org/en/publications/good-humanitarian-donorship-a-mouse-or-a-lion/
- Orbinski, J. (1999, December 10). Nobel Peace Prize speech. Médecins Sans Frontières. https://www.msf.org/nobel-peace-prize-speech
- Pantuliano, S., Mackintosh, K., Elhawary, S., & Metcalfe, V. (2011). Counter-terrorism and humanitarian action: Tensions, impact and ways forward (HPG Policy Brief 43). Overseas Development Institute. https://alnap.org/documents/5552/7347.pdf
- Slim, H. (1997). Relief agencies and moral standing in war: Principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and solidarity. Development in Practice, 7(4), 342–352. https://doi.org/10.1080/09614529754134
- Stockton, N. (1998). In defence of humanitarianism. Disasters, 22(4), 352–360. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7717.00098
- Stoddard, A. (2003). Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and trends (HPG Briefing No. 12). Overseas Development Institute. https://media.odi.org/documents/349.pdf
- Thieux, L. (2006). El impacto de la «Guerra global contra el terror» sobre el sistema internacional de ayuda y la acción humanitaria. En F. Rey Marcos, L. Thieux, & V. de Currea-Lugo (Eds.), La acción humanitaria en la encrucijada: Avanzando propuestas para reforzar la acción humanitaria en el siglo XXI (pp. 34–47). Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria. https://iecah.org/avanzando-propuestas-para-reforzar-la-accion-humanitaria-en-el-siglo-xxi/
NotebookLM
You can review my bibliographic references on 9/11, the War on Terror and humanitarian action with this NotebookLM, an artificial intelligence-based research assistant. Want to know more?
How to cite this page
Abarca, B. (June 12, 2026). 9/11, the War on Terror and humanitarian action. Salud Everywhere. https://saludeverywhere.com/en/humanitarian-aid-and-international-development/9-11-war-on-terror-humanitarian-action/